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Balancing “Parents Are” and “Parents Do” in the
Supreme Court’s Constitutionalized Family Law:
Some Implications for the ALI Proposals
on De Facto Parenthood∗
David M. Wagner∗∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Chapter 2 of the American Law Institute’s (“ALI”) proposed
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution1 proposes to widen considerably two relatively new concepts in family law: “de facto parenthood”2 and “parenthood by estoppel.”3 Of course, persons other
than biological or adoptive parents have been acting in parental roles
∗ This article was presented at the Symposium on the ALI Principles of the Law of
Family Dissolution, held at Brigham Young University’s J. Reuben Clark Law School on February 1, 2001.
∗∗ Associate Professor, Regent University School of Law; B.A., Yale, 1980; M.A., Yale,
1984; J.D., George Mason University School of Law, 1992.
1. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS &
RECOMMENDATIONS (Tentative Draft No. 4, Apr. 10, 2000) § 2.03 [hereinafter PRINCIPLES
(Tentative Draft No. 4)].
2. A concept by the name of “de facto parenthood” is given limited recognition in
California’s Family Law Act of 1969. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600; see also CAL. R. COURT
1401, 1410, 1412. “The term de facto parenthood has its genesis in the juvenile justice system
and generally has been used to refer to foster parents caring for dependent children.” Z.C.W.
v. Lisa W., 71 Cal. App. 4th 524, 528 (1999). A Florida court rejected a same-sex partner’s
claim to de facto parenthood in Music v. Rachford, 654 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1995).
3. In 1991, Wisconsin rejected both “de facto parenthood” and the notion of an “‘equitable’ parent”; In re Interest of Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d 202, 207 (Wis. 1991). But Z.J.H. was
overruled on this point in In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995). The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court granted visitation to a biological mother’s former samesex partner, over the biological mother’s objections, invoking both “de facto parenthood” and
the “equitable parent doctrine,” E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999). The court
specifically cited the PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION (Tentative Draft No.
3, Part I, March 20, 1998) § 2.03. E.N.O., 711 N.E. 2d at 891. In Pennsylvania, a court as
early as 1979 used the term “parent by estoppel” where a putative father—later conclusively
proved not to be the biological father of the child—had failed to file exceptions to a final order
of support for a child born to his wife ten years after he and his wife had separated. Commonwealth ex rel Nixon v. Nixon, 458 A.2d 976, 978 (Pa. 1983). The court, however, allowed the
filing of the exception nunc pro tunc. Id. at 982.
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toward children for ages; what is new here as in other parts of the
ALI Principles4 is the taking of historically nonlegal relationships into
the domain of law.
This proposal would recognize and regularize the notion that
adults unrelated to a child may establish the legal equivalent of parenthood over that child provided (1) that they have acted in a parental role toward that child and (2) that such conduct was authorized
by one of the natural parents. The ALI proposal forces us to think
about the nature and origins of parental status. Does parental status
begin and end with the biological link, or, on the contrary, is it the
case that “parents are as parents do”?
From my perspective as a constitutionalist rather than a family
law expert, I would like to examine how the cases in the field of constitutionalized family law balance the sometimes competing claims of
nature and nurture in settling contested claims of parental rights, and
what conclusions can be drawn from that examination in regard to
the ALI proposed expansion of the concept of de facto parenthood.
Section II of this essay will walk us through the case law on parental rights that developed in the context of the fathers’ rights cases
of the 1970s and 1980s. Section III attempts to synthesize this case
law so as to show its relevance to the question of de facto parenthood. Section IV applies this synthesis to the de facto parenthood
concept, and Section V offers some concluding reflections, namely,
(1) that expansive notions of de facto parenthood are not required
by constitutional case law, which continues to respect both biological
parenthood and customary usage, and (2) that such notions risk
bringing about what I call parent inflation, devaluing an already tooscarce resource.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS ESTABLISHED IN THE CONTEXT
OF FATHERS’ RIGHTS
When the Supreme Court first held that Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process entitled an unwed biological father to a hearing on his
parental fitness before custody of his children could be assigned
elsewhere following the death of the children’s mother,5 Chief Justice Burger predicted in dissent that the case would signal “a novel
4. For example, the ALI cloaks cohabitation with legal consequences. PRINCIPLES
(Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, §§ 6.01–6.05.
5. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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concept of the natural law” and that this project would “have strange
boundaries as yet undiscernible.”6 Stanley did indeed turn out to be
the start of a strange Rhine Journey, but a quarter of a century later,
especially in light of the Court’s 1989 holding in Michael H. v. Gerald D.,7 the river carrying us along has not yet overflowed its banks.
The Court has affirmed the importance of the biological aspect of
parenthood, sometimes, as in Stanley, giving it considerable importance. Thus, we can conclude that “parents are,” that is, parenthood
is to some extent an identity arising out of biological facts.
But at the same time, the Court has consistently affirmed that
parenthood is a social role, such that those who play the role have
enhanced status before the law if and when their parenthood is
drawn into question. Thus, even in Stanley, the majority of the
Court pointed to Mr. Stanley’s frequent (though not uninterrupted)
efforts to act as father to his children,8 while the dissenters disputed
the evidence for this.9 Both agreed, however, that the issue was relevant to Mr. Stanley’s claim.10 Thus, we can conclude that “parents
do,” that is, parenthood is to some extent a role defined by legal, social, and traditional expectations, and those who play the role get the
status—or may get it. The qualifications of this “may” are among the
issues raised by the ALI drafts.
In Quilloin v. Walcott,11 the Court found no Due Process violation where the natural father, complaining of lack of opportunity to
veto his child’s adoption, had done nothing to exercise or claim parental rights. Biology was not enough. Why not? Set against Mr.
Quilloin’s biologically-based claims were the claims of a legal family,
6. Id. at 668 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
7. 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (in which the Court considered the constitutionality of the
irrebuttable “marital presumption”—the presumption that a child born to a married woman
and conceived during a time when her husband was neither impotent nor out of the country is
conclusively presumed to be a “child of the marriage”—as applied against an adulterous natural
father who wished to attain parental rights over his natural daughter over the objections of the
girl’s natural mother and legal father. In a plurality opinion, the Court held that this presumption is rationally related to the legitimate state interest in protecting the legitimacy of children
and insulating intact families from blast-from-the-past attacks. Invoking a jurisprudence of tradition, it also held that the adulterous natural father could not show that his interest was one
that American legal traditions have historically fostered and protected; rather the opposite, in
fact).
8. See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 650–51, 655.
9. See id. at 667 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
10. See id. at 649; id. at 662–63 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
11. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
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into which the child’s mother, Ardell Williams, proposed to enter
with her marriage to Randall Walcott, and into which she wished to
bring her child.12 As the Court noted at the outset, “the countervailing interests are more substantial”13 than in Stanley. Winding up the
analysis for the unanimous Court, Justice Marshall remarked: “[T]he
result of the adoption in this case is to give full recognition to a family unit already in existence, a result desired by all concerned, except
appellant.”14
Furthermore, Quilloin “did not petition for legitimation of his
child at any time during the [eleven] years between the child’s birth
and the filing of Randall Walcott’s adoption petition,”15 and he
“[did] not complain of his exemption from [paternal] responsibilities
and, indeed, he does not even now seek custody of his child.”16
Thus, two rationales were offered by the Quilloin Court for its
outcome: first, an emerging estoppel doctrine17 based on the “parents do” approach to parental rights and second, respect for marriage
as a legal institution capable of overriding the competing interests of
an individual. Justice Marshall’s bon mot about everyone except appellant being pleased with the adoption should not be taken to mean
that the Court resolves these disputes by polling the leading participants. Rather, the Court is indicating that the challenged law did
what society expects family law to do: provide a legal framework for
stable and predictable family relationships and thereby serve the best
interests of the child.18 The two rationales of Quilloin—that the law
rightly prefers formal family units, and that Mr. Quilloin had failed
to act as we expect parents to act—are complementary: both speak
essentially of socio-legal roles and expectations. The Quilloin decision suggests rather strongly that in questions of custody, we are
dealing with social roles as much as—and perhaps more than—
individual rights or claims.
12. See id. at 247.
13. Id. at 248.
14. Id. at 255.
15. Id. at 249.
16. Id. at 256.
17. The estoppel doctrine dictates that if a parent does not have a social relationship
with the child, then that parent is estopped from interfering with the adoption of the child by
the new husband of the mother. This doctrine is based on the belief that respect for the marriage institution outweighs the other interests at stake.
18. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 789 (2d ed. 1988).
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Were both of these rationales necessary? Would Mr. Quilloin
have won, despite his inactivity as a parent, if Mr. Walcott and Ms.
Williams wished to adopt the child without marrying? Or taking the
reverse, would Mr. Quilloin have won if he had taken a substantial
part in the child’s upbringing, notwithstanding the Walcotts’ marriage?
This latter fact pattern came to the Court one year later in Caban
v. Mohammed,19 the only case in this series in which a plaintiff successfully interrupts an adoption. Here, in a 5-4 decision, the Court
held that the Equal Protection Clause was violated by a rule that allowed unwed mothers, but not unwed fathers, to veto an adoption
without showing that it would be contrary to the best interests of the
child (an issue that was not properly presented in Quilloin20). A simple application of the Equal Protection section of the Stanley opinion21 might have solved the Caban case. But the Court also stressed,
in two footnotes, another distinction from Quilloin: Leon Quilloin,
unlike Abdiel Caban, had “fail[ed] to act as a father toward his children,”22 and “the relationship that in fact exists between parent and
child” is important “in cases of this kind.”23
This welcome affirmation of the importance of actually-existing
relationships came at some cost in that it devalued what Justice
Stewart in dissent called the father’s “legal tie”24 with the mother.
Justice Stewart sees this primarily in terms of denying a child the
“benefit of legitimacy,” a benefit that the majority opinion allows
unwed fathers to withhold from their children, at least where an effective father-child relationship exists.25 One might add that the
benefits lost by children under the Caban holding are not only le19. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
20. The principal equal protection issue in Quilloin concerned the disparate treatment
of married and unmarried fathers. The Court said simply: “We think appellant’s interests are
readily distinguishable from those of a separated or divorced father, and accordingly believe
that the State could permissibly give appellant less veto authority than it provides to a married
father.” Id. at 256. The issue of whether equal protection demands equal treatment of unwed
fathers and unwed mothers, later squarely presented in Caban, was only alluded to in the last
paragraph of appellant’s brief in Quilloin. See Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 253 n.13.
21. “[D]enying such a hearing [on parental fitness] to Stanley and those like him [i.e.
unmarried fathers] while granting it to other Illinois parents is inescapably contrary to the
Equal Protection Clause.” 405 U.S. at 658.
22. Caban, 441 U.S. at 389 n.7.
23. Id. at 393 n.14.
24. Id. at 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
25. Id.
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gitimacy (a decreasingly significant benefit in modern society anyway), but also the stability and predictability that children need and
that are furthered by legal formality.26
As Justice Stewart also notes, the majority in Caban requires
adoption to pass a double obstacle course: ratification by both parents, not just one, at least where both parents have had a parental relationship with the child.27 For Justice Stewart, this holding is a regrettable deterrent to adoptions, but, for the time being, such are
the demands of Equal Protection. Significantly, portions of Justice
Stewart’s dissent were adopted as part of the opinion of the Court in
Lehr v. Robertson.28 Lehr may be said to form a bridge between Caban and Michael H. Jonathan Lehr, having begotten Jessica M. out
of wedlock, sought to block the adoption of Jessica by her mother,
Lorraine, and Lorraine’s new husband, Richard Robertson. Mr. Lehr
had not, however, formed a paternal relationship with Jessica. Thus,
Lehr may be said to be Caban without the actually-existing relationship between the plaintiff-father and the child. Lehr is also Michael
H. without the actually-existing marriage at the time the child was
conceived and born. The result is in contrast with Caban and in line
with Michael H.—that is, the unwed father loses—suggesting that
Quilloin, Lehr, and Michael H. are the lead cases, and Caban the
outlier.
III. DEFINING CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS
What does this tell us about the issue of “parents are” versus
“parents do,” or nature versus nurture? First, within that dichotomy,
the Court placed more stress on “parents do,” or nurture. Thus, Abdiel Caban won because he had acted as a social and effective father,
26. These benefits are also discussed by Justice Stevens in a separate dissent:
[A] rule that gives the mother of the newborn infant the exclusive right to consent
to its adoption . . . gives the mother, in whose sole charge the infant is often placed
anyway, the maximum flexibility in deciding how best to care for the child. It also
gives the loving father an incentive to marry the mother, and has no adverse impact
on the disinterested father. Finally, it facilitates the interests of the adoptive parents,
the child, and the public at large by streamlining the often traumatic adoption process and allowing the prompt, complete, and reliable integration of the child into a
satisfactory new home at as young an age as is feasible.
Id. at 407–08 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Obviously, Justice Stevens’s view will be less compelling
the less one views the father marrying the mother as a prima facie benefit to the child.
27. Id. at 395 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
28. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).

1180

12WAG.DOC

1175]

12/5/01 2:44 AM

Balancing “Parents Are” and “Parents Do”

not just as a biological father, to his child, while Leon Quilloin and
Jonathan Lehr lost because they did not. Paul Stanley won partly because he was the biological father, but also because he had a paternal
relationship with the children. The social rather than the biological
aspect of parenting seems to be the determining factor. Thus, all
lights seem to be green for the ALI project of expanding de facto
parenthood.
But we have not yet accounted for Michael H. In this case—
made famous by its footnote six29 and by its coruscating by-play between Justices Scalia and Brennan30—a plaintiff-father situated very
similarly to Abdiel Caban nonetheless loses. Why? Because in Michael H., unlike Caban, “an extant marital unit that wishe[d] to embrace the child”31 existed at the time she was conceived; this fact
triggered the marital presumption rule,32 which was the actual focus
of the litigation. At the end of the day, the Court held that a marriage that is both formal (a marriage recognized as such by law) and
effective (its participants desire to maintain it and to keep within it
“the child they acknowledge to be theirs”33) prevails even over an
unwed father who has had a paternal relationship with the child.
Why is this outcome significant? In Lehr, the Court adopted por29. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6. This footnote, written by Justice
Scalia and joined only by Chief Justice Rehnquist, suggests a methodology for reconciling the
substantive due process cases that trace their lineage to Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), with the demands of judicial
restraint. In a nutshell, this methodology consists of articulating new constitutional rightsclaims at “the most specific level [of generality] at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified.” Micheal H., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6.
Any other method, Justice Scalia argues, including that of leaving it up to the Court to decide
the appropriate “level of generality” at which to articulate a rights-claim, would “permit judges
to dictate rather than discern the society’s views.” Id.
30. 491 U.S. at 123 n.2, 124 n.4, 126 n.5, 127 n.6, 129 n.7 & 130; see also id. at 137,
156 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
31. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127.
32. The “marital presumption” is the common-law rule that a child born to a married
woman, assuming her husband was neither impotent nor out of the country at the time of
conception, is conclusively (or, in some jurisdictions, rebuttably) presumed to be legitimate.
See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 117. The purpose of this “fundamental principle of common
law,” id. at 124, is to protect children’s legitimacy by relieving them of the need to prove it
except in unusual cases. See id. at 125 (common law had “an aversion to declaring children
illegitimate”). As Justice Scalia explains in Michael H., citing a five hundred year span of common law authorities, id. at 124–25, the rule also preserves family stability by “excluding inquiries into the child’s paternity that would be destructive of family integrity and privacy.” Id. at
120.
33. Id. at 124.
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tions of Justice Stewart’s Caban dissent to the effect that a “legal tie”
between the parents may limit “whatever substantive constitutional
claims might otherwise exist”34 on the part of outsiders to that legal
tie, even if that outsider is a biological father enjoying an “actual relationship with the children.”35 Justice Stewart’s “legal tie” dictum
was further adopted by the plurality in Michael H.36 in support of a
theme that runs throughout that opinion: the tradition of our family
law favors the creation and maintenance of a formal, legal entity (one
may call it the “unitary family”); the family law tradition further favors the immunizing of this entity against legal attack (hence the legitimacy presumption at issue in Michael H.) and makes this entity,
in an important sense, exclusive. Access to the entity for an outsider
is decidedly the exception and not the rule.
Thus, the combined teaching of Caban, Lehr, and Michael H.
seems to be that the unwed biological father has constitutionallyprotected parental rights if, but only if, he has established a paternal
relationship with the child and no marital unit exists with which such
rights would conflict. Thus, to the dichotomy of “parents are” and
“parents do” or nature and nurture, Lehr and Michael H. add a
third term, which may be called “formality” or “legality.”
Legality and tradition are not unrelated phenomena. But here,
clashing jurisprudential philosophies beckon.37 I will make a merely
Burkean claim,38 perhaps filtered through Alasdair MacIntyre:39 laws
34. Lehr, 463 U.S. 262 (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting)).
35. Id.
36. 491 U.S. at 128–29.
37. For instance, one may be an Austinian positivist, see generally JOHN AUSTIN, THE
PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (photo. reprint 1984) (1832), in which case one
would most likely believe that the backing of tradition may make the masses feel better about a
law but will not even remotely affect the law’s validity. Or one may be a natural law theorist—
and then debate whether natural law privileges marriage as traditionally understood, as argued
in John Finnis, The Good of Marriage and the Morality of Sexual Relations: Some Philosophical and Historical Observations, 42 AM. J. JURIS. 97 (1997) and in Robert P. George &
Gerard Bradley, Marriage and the Liberal Imagination, 84 GEO. L.J. 301 (1995), or whether it
privileges moral innovation and/or self-fulfillment, as argued in KENNETH L. KARST, LAW’S
PROMISE, LAW’S EXPRESSION (1993) and in David A.J. Richards, Constitutional Legitimacy
and Constitutional Privacy, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 800 (1986).
38. See generally EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE
(photo. reprint 1993) (1790).
39. See generally ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY
(1984); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? (1988); David
Wagner, Alasdair MacIntyre: Recovering the Rationality of Traditions, in LIBERALISM AT THE
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that lack roots in the established practices of a community can be effective, if at all, only through force. On the contrary, laws that reflect
and protect the customs of a community are conducive to civic
peace. To be sure, such laws run the risk of ossifying ancient errors
under color of “tradition.” But this harm—and it is one—is balanced
by the fact that civic peace conduces to trust among citizens, which
is a pre-condition for consensual change in the law. (Trust among
citizens can, of course, be dispensed with where legal change is to be
brought about by violent revolution or by judicial activism.)
IV. APPLYING CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS TO
DE FACTO PARENTING
What does this have to do with whether state laws should
broaden the category of de facto parenthood in post-divorce custody
conflicts? After all, ex hypothesi, no extant marital unit40 exists to
provide a Michael H.-type “extant family” with which the claims of a
de facto parent could conflict. Furthermore, if legality and legal recognition are our concern, then surely legal recognition of such rights
is the solution, not the problem.
There are two problems with this point of view. One is that the
ALI drafts contemplate the recognition of de facto parenthood on
the part of persons who have engaged in parent-like activities toward
the child, provided those activities took place with the consent of
one—not both!—of the natural parents.41 There is at least some tension between this rule and the holding in Caban: that when both
parents have established a parental relationship with the child, both
parents must sign off on an adoption, i.e., on any legal recognition
of parental rights in persons who have not hitherto possessed them
in regard to the child in question.
Caban to one side, I can see arguments both for and against the
one-parent rule for creating the precursor facts for de facto parent-

CROSSROADS 97 (C. Wolfe & J. Hittinger eds. 1994).
40. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
41. A de facto parent is an individual other than a legal parent or a parent by estoppel
who, for a significant period of time not less than two years, (i) lived with the child and, (ii) for
reasons primarily other than financial compensation, and with the agreement of a legal parent
to form a parent-child relationship. . . . (A) regularly performed a majority of the caretaking
functions for the child, or (B) regularly performed a share of caretaking functions at least as
great as that of the parent with whom the child primarily lived.
PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 2.03 (second emphasis added).
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hood. In favor of it is the argument made by Justice Stewart in his
Caban dissent regarding adoption,42 applied by analogy to de facto
parenthood: to give both parents a veto power over adoption will
impede the adoption process, promote tactical obstruction by a parent holding out for something else, and so forth. If de facto parenthood is beneficial to children, then requiring bi-parental consent for
its creation—or, more accurately, for the precursor facts for its creation—is undesirable.
But this only brings me to my second problem with de facto parenthood legislation. De facto parenthood is not necessarily as beneficial to children as adoption. It does not, for instance, guarantee the
child a home—only a relationship. This may make de facto parenthood congenial to an era that values relationships but tends to denigrate the concept of the home: after all, relationships are fluid and
expressive, whereas homes tend to be solid, silent, and stationary.43 It
is true, of course, that children whose natural parents have divorced
benefit greatly from parent-like relationships with other adults; the
inevitable pain of parental divorce is greatly lessened for many children by teachers, coaches, and other mentors who take up some of
the slack left by divorcing parents. But these heroes do not need legal status to do what they are doing.
What then does de facto parenthood contribute? It is not the
equivalent of adoption; it is not necessary for a mentoring relationship; it does, however, sow uncertainty and fluidity about the meaning of parenthood.
Consequently, the specter of “parent inflation” must be considered. We know what happens when governments print money without restraint: the result is not more wealth, but less, as each unit of
money declines in value. Parent-child relationships, of course, are not
currency, but they have at least this much in common with it: they
are valuable at least in part because of their protected legal status.
When the government prints “This note is legal tender for all debts,
42. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
43. There is now an extensive literature seeking to rehabilitate the concepts of home and
family from attacks rooted in expressive individualism. See, e.g., BARBARA DAFOE
WHITEHEAD, THE DIVORCE CULTURE (1996) (esp. ch. 3); MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE
ABOLITION OF MARRIAGE (1996); MAGGIE GALLAGHER, ENEMIES OF EROS (1989); MAGGIE
GALLAGHER & LINDA WAITE, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE (2000); CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE
CULTURE OF NARCISSISM (1979); CHRISTOPHER LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD:
THE FAMILY BESIEGED (photo. reprint 1995) (1977); DANA MACK, THE ASSAULT ON
PARENTHOOD: HOW OUR CULTURE UNDERMINES THE FAMILY (1997).

1184

12WAG.DOC

1175]

12/5/01 2:44 AM

Balancing “Parents Are” and “Parents Do”

public and private” on a bill, it is giving that bill a special status vis-àvis other pieces of paper. It can extend that status to more and more
pieces of paper, but the only effect of such “de facto currency” will
be to make all currency less valuable.
Not that such experiments would be unconstitutional. As the
plurality in Michael H. stressed, it was the state legislature in that
case, not the Court, that made the value judgment that the Court
upheld. There may be a Meyer-Pierce-based argument to be made
against de facto parenthood,44 but it would take considerable judicial
activism for the Court to buy such an argument. If judicial activism is
to be avoided, as I think it should be, the Court’s family law cases
from Meyer to Michael H. cannot be read to create a constitutional
obstacle to de facto parenthood.
But if they do not prohibit it, neither do they encourage it. The
doctrine of these cases, and of Michael H. in particular, is that the
dichotomy of “parents are” and “parents do,” of biology and sociality, or nature and nurture, is inadequate. Biology and sociality, or nature and nurture, are both important in the creation and maintenance of families, but a further step must be taken, namely, the
“legal tie” of which Justice Stewart spoke45 and the formality implied
in his concept of the “formal family.”
It is not enough to say that states will change their laws in light
of the ALI recommendations, thus providing the needed formality.
My argument is that of the three—nature, nurture, and formality—
none of the three is dispensable. The ALI would ground the new
formality of de facto parenthood in the nurture provided by the de
facto parent, but the link to the natural or biological family is slender; the ALI proposal requires the consent of only one natural parent, and the consent is not to the de facto parental relationship itself.
Rather, the consent is only to the precursor facts that the would-be

44. The argument might go: Meyer, Pierce, and their progeny stand for the preferred
position of the family and of parent-child relationships in our constitutional order, as those
concepts were understood at the time these decisions were rendered, or else at the time the
Fourteenth Amendment, which these decisions construe, was drafted. An attempt by government to undermine this institution by “parental inflation” may well violate the longrecognized rights of parents, much as government action that destroys the value of an individual’s material holdings may be unconstitutional as a “taking” under the Fifth Amendment.
But, as noted in the text, this argument would require of the Court a legislative role that it has
often repudiated, not least in Michael H. itself.
45. See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text.
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de facto parent may later use in their petition for that status from a
court.46
V. CONCLUSION
I respectfully suggest that the impulse toward de facto parenthood is driven at least in part by the perception that what children
need are relationships with adults, rather than the social and legal institutions that have an historical track record in fostering relationships. The thinking seems to be this: take the best mentoring relationships you can think of, add legal recognition, and, as my fiveyear-old daughter likes to say, “hocus-pocus-ala-kazamm-VOILÀ!”
But, without taking anything away from what mentoring relationships can do for children, what children really need are homes—that
is, one or preferably two natural or adoptive parents, plus a ceiling
and four walls, and some hope of stability and duration.
De facto parenthood, and the “parent inflation” that it represents, contradicts the need to preserve the parental relationship as a
special and uniquely valuable one. Instead, it contributes to the individual life projects of the adults who wish to achieve de facto parental status. It is, so to speak, “about” the grown-ups, and not “about”
the children.
In conclusion, good family law is not infinitely plastic. Certain
realities exist that our laws can reflect or fight with, but not ignore.
As social critic Maggie Gallagher has argued:
We did not, in the first place, create the erotic drama that marriage
embodies. We do not make Eros, it makes us, and the world. . . .
Children are the great sign of Eros, who make nonsense of contract
because they make nonsense of everything, because they make no
sense at all. If greed or reason ruled the world instead of Eros,
there would be no children.47

Of course, much of present-day theorizing about family and sexual relationships assumes that we did, in fact, create the erotic drama
of childbearing to which Gallagher refers.48 If we created it, we can
manipulate it. This is not the occasion to go to the fundamentals of

46. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1.
47. MAGGIE GALLAGHER, ENEMIES OF EROS 209–10 (1989).
48. See, e.g., TAMSIN SPARGO, FOUCAULT AND QUEER THEORY 11–13 (1999).
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this argument.49 I would maintain, though, that if the twenty-first
century witnesses tinkering with the fundamentals of human relationships the way the twentieth witnessed tinkering with the fundamentals of economic relationships, it will be another century of statesponsored chaos and disaster.
Just as, in Gallagher’s argument, marriage is too great and mysterious to be contained by contract law, so parenthood is too great and
mysterious to be within the gift of legislators or law reformers, however well-intentioned. Revelation to one side, only the composite
common sense of the generations—sometimes called tradition—can
come up with a system of parental law. A priori system-makers will
be ineffective at best, and destructive at worst.
American law should adhere to the known and existing means of
creating the parental relationship. Parents do, of course, need help in
rearing their children—help from family, friends, voluntary associations, and, in extreme cases, government agencies—and the more
straitened the circumstances of a particular parent, the more such
help that parent will need. But the sources of that help should be
honored under their familiar names, as for instance when Alasdair
MacIntyre writes:
Neither the state nor the family then is the form of association
whose common good is to be both served and sustained by the virtues of acknowledged dependence. It must instead be some form of
local community with which the activities of families, workplaces,
schools, clinics, clubs dedicated to debate and clubs dedicated to
games and sports, and religious congregations may all find a
place.50

Uncles, aunts, bosses, colleagues, teachers, doctors, nurses, debating partners, coaches, teammates, clergymen, and others that did
not make MacIntyre’s list, always have and always will help parents,
sometimes to a heroic degree. But opening up an easy way for them
to attain the name and legal status of “parent” over their nieces,
nephews, students, patients, team members, congregants, etc., will
only devalue that name and that legal status, while doing nothing for
the children that is not already being done.

49. But see supra notes 32 and 37.
50. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, DEPENDENT RATIONAL ANIMALS: WHY HUMAN BEINGS
NEED THE VIRTUES 135 (1999).
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